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NOTES
THE PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
AND THE REGULATION OF CHILDREN'S TELEVISION:
THROWING OUT THE BABY WITH THE BATHWATER?
L INTRODUCTION
Thirty-five years ago, there was a children's television program
called Winky Dink and You.' Today, Winky Dink might be called
an ancestor of "interactive" programming, that is, programming to
enable a viewer to respond to the action on the screen and thereby
participate in the outcome of the show.' In Winky Dink, this was
done by means of a soft, clear plastic sheet that a child laid over the
television screen, on which he or she would draw with crayons in
response to visual and aural cues from Winky Dink and his friends.
If Winky was chased to the edge of a cliff, he might turn to the
audience and ask for a bridge to be drawn across the chasm on
which he could make his escape. Once safely across the crayoned
bridge, he would ask his viewers to erase it to forestall his big, bad
pursuers. Or he might call for a disguise for himself or a house to
rest in or for a moustache to be drawn across the face of a
particularly evil villain. A Winky Dink kit, consisting of the plastic
sheet, erasable crayons, eraser, and an instruction booklet, was on
sale through the mail, but it was not essential. Similar objects
around the house could suffice. Television was still a young
1. "Winky Dink and You" aired from October 10, 1953 through April 27, 1957. McNEIL,
TOTAL TELEVISION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE To PROGRAMMING FROM 1948 To THE
PRESENT 719 (1984).
2. The Federal Communications Commission defines an interactive device as "one intended
for recreational or educational use, the operation of which can be controlled by signalling
information contained in a television program." In rc Revision of Programming &
Commercialization Policies, 2 F.C.C. Rcd 6822 (1987).
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medium s There was relatively little research to measure not only
what a child chose to view, but how the experience of watching
television generally, and of watching certain types of programming
specifically, shaped children's perceptions of the "real" world beyond
television and thus influenced behavior. 4 Children's television has
changed since Winky Dink. A new trend in children's television is
programming that sends out inaudible signals, enabling viewers to
interact with the program via a special toy capable of picking up
the signal.' Such a toy is used to "shoot" certain characters whose
torsos are highlighted as targets. Aside from the obvious shift from
crayons to laser beams and from drawing to shooting, it is claimed
that such interactive programming takes advantage of children who
are not capable of realizing that they are actually watching a
program-length commercial for the interactive toy.6 Whether a kit
costing several dollars in 1955 and a laser toy costing some thir-
ty-five to forty-five dollars in 1988 are different enough to justify
disparate regulatory treatment is an open question, and is, in part,
the concern of this article. Though the essential form of the
programming remains the same, one may wonder whether such
3. L. BOGART, THE AGE OF TELEVISION, 8-9 (3d. ed. 1972). Television was first developed
during the 1920's and 1930's. Id. at 8. However, World War II interupted its developement
since, during that period, no new televisions were sold. Id. By January of 1948 there were
102,000 television sets in the nation; that number doubled by the end of the year. Id.
Expansion was interupted by a freeze on new station permits which lasted from September
1948 until July 1952. Id. at 9. When the freeze was lifted a "boom" in the television industry
quickly followed. Id.
4. Early studies were crisis-oriented, and thus were limited in their conceptualization of
media usage and effects. Focusing on short-term stimulus and response behaviors, these
studies ignored such processes as media selection and television's impact beyond the
immediate viewing situation. These studies were primarily experimental in nature, and failed
to recognize the myriad of variables that affect the use and effects of television. Only
recently have researchers begun to recognize the complexity of the viewing process. See, e.g.,
M.A. WOLF, NATURAL AUDIENCES: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH OF MEDIA USEs AND EFFECTS
58 (T. Lindlof ed. 1987).
5. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1987, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 31, col. 1.
6. Responding to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling in National Ass'n. of Better
Broadcasting v. F.C.C. (KCOP Television), 830 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987), Peggy Charren,
president of Action for Children's Television, remarked, "It's another nail in the coffin of
program-length commercials." Davis, FCC Ruling That Gives Toy Companies Anony)ni o , on
TV Shows Is Overturned, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1987, at 28, col. 1.
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technologically sophisticated forms of interactive programming may
have entirely different effects on children.
The recent history of children's television regulation, however,
has generally been marked by a retreat from the government's
recognition of the profound effects of televised messages on children
and the need for specific guidelines to reflect these "high public
interest considerations."7  A series of decisions, including the
suspension of the National Association of Broadcasters' (NAB)
Code,8 the Federal Trade Commission's (FFC) claim that only
commercials causing "substantial injury" should be prohibited,9 and
the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) advocacy of
marketplace economics,1" have eroded a protective system of checks
and balances.
Advances in technology and marketing have further complicated
the controversy surrounding the effects of deregulation. A toy
manufacturer was recently rebuffed in its attempts to circumvent
sponsorship announcements by entering into a barter arrangement
with a television station." In exchange for programming produced
by the manufacturer, the station gave commercial time to the
manufacturer without requiring disclosure of its sponsorship of the
program. 2 The case was remanded to the FCC for the development
7. Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C., 821 F.2d 741, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
8. See infra notes 48-66 and 84-101 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
11. National Ass'n. for Better Broadcasting v. F.C.C. (KCOP Television), 830 F. 2d 270
(D.C. Cir. 1987). At issue was the FCC's interpretation of a section of the Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (1962) which states: "All matter broadcast by any radio
stationfor which any money, service, or valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid
... the station so broadcasting ... shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, be announced
as paid for or furnished, as the case may be, by such person . . . ." Id. A three-judge
appeals court panel rejected the FCC's rationale that identifying the toy makers as sponsors
wasn't necessary so long as the entire program wasn't commercial in nature. Judge
Spottswood Robinson, writing for the unanimous panel, said, "[w]e are satisfied that the
commission's construction of section 317 is inconsistent with the manifest intention of
Congress." National An for Better Broadcasting, 830 F.2d at 277. The provision, stemming
from the broadcast payola scandals of the 1950's, is aimed at informing viewers about who
is paying for the programming. Davis, supra note 4, at 28.
12. National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting, 830 F.2d at 271. See also Davis, supra note
1988]
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of workable and legally enforceable standards for such barter
arrangements in light of their growing prevalence in children's
programming. 3
It is clear that deregulation has highlighted the struggle
between those who advocate allowing the marketplace to determine
the content of programming and advertising and those who advocate
stricter controls over the airways. In Action for Children's Advertis-
ing (ACT) v. F.C.C., 4 a decision roundly hailed by advocates of
federal regulation of children's television, 5 a federal appeals court
unanimously upheld ACT's challenge to the FCC's failure to evince
a "reasoned basis" adequate to support its 1984 termination of its
longstanding children's television commercialization guidelines. 6 The
Court remanded the case to the FCC, and observed that "the
Commission has offered neither facts nor analysis to the effect that
its earlier concerns over market failure were overemphasized,
misguided, outdated, or just downright incorrect . *..."17 "Instead,"
the court said, "the FCC, without explanation, suddenly embraced
what had theretofore been an unthinkable bureaucratic conclusion
that the market did in fact operate to restrain the commercial
13. National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting, 830 F.2d at 270.
14. Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C., 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
15. MIT Communications Forum: New Issues in Children's Television Policy, (Dec. 3,
1987) (audiotaped statement of Peggy Charren).
16. Action for Children's Television, 821 F.2d at 741. The FCC had been, as early as
1971, concerned with the effect of what it termed "the most powerful communications
medium ever devised, in relation to a large and important segment of the audience, the
nation's children." In re Petition of Action for Children's Television, 28 F.C.C.2d 368, 369-
70 (1971) (Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). In 1974, the FCC
published an exhaustive report which concluded that children are "far more trusting of and
vulnerable to commercial 'pitches' than are adults," and that 'Very young children cannot
distinguish conceptually between programming and advertising." In re Petition of Action for
Children's Television, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 11 (1974) (Children's Television Report and Policy
Statement). To address these concerns, the FCC adopted specific guidelines on the
permissible level of commercialization in children's programming and strict requirements that
broadcasters maintain adequate separation between program content and commercial
messages. Id. at 15-16. In 1978, the FCC reaffirmed its commitment to specific advertising
guidelines. In re Children's Programming and Advertising Practices, 68 F.C.C.2d 1344 (1978)
(Second Notice of Inquiry).
17. Action for Children's Television, 821 F.2d at 746.
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content of children's television."" The FCC, faced with either
establishing a factual basis for its decision to embrace marketplace
forces as sufficient regulators of advertisers' activities, or, alternative-
ly, reopening the public record on the issue with a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking19 opted for the latter choice, with comments
due February 19, 1988 and reply comments April 4, 1988.0
On another front, Congress has conducted hearings on the need
for children's television commercialization guidelines, culminating in
the passage of legislation in the House by a vote of 328 to 7821 and
by voice vote in the Senate' designed to reinstate the FCC's former
commercialization guidelines.' President Reagan exercised his
18. Id.
19. In re Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, 2 F.C.C. Rcd 6822
(1987).
20. 53 Fed. Reg. 426 (1988) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) (proposed Jan. 7, 1988).
21. 134 CONG. REC. H4010 (daily ed. June 8, 1988) (statement of Mr. Carr).
22. 134 CONG. REC. S16861 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988).
23. H.R. 3966, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H3979 (1988). The bill provides,
in pertinent part:
SEC. 3. RULEMAKING REQUIRED.
(a) RULEMAKING ON COMMERCIAL TIME REOUIRED.--The Federal Communications
Commission shall, within 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, initiate
a rulemaking proceeding to prescribe standards applicable to commercial television
broadcast licensees with respect to the time devoted to commercial matter in
conjunction with children's television programming.
(b) REQUIREMENTS FOR STANDARDS.--The standards required by subsection (a) shall
require commercial television broadcast licensees to limit the duration of advertising
in children's programming, on and after January 1, 1990, to not more than 10.5
minutes per hour on weekends and not more than 12 minutes per hour on
weekdays, except that, after January 1, 1993, the Commission shall have the
authority--
(1) to review and evaluate the standards prescribed under this sub-
paragraph; and
(2) after notice and public comment and a demonstration of the need
for a modification of such standards, to modify such standards in
accordance with the public interest.
(c) TIME FOR COMPLETION OF RULEMAKING.--The Commission shall, within 150 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, prescribe final standards in accordance with
the requirements of subsection (b).
SEC. 4. CONSIDERATION OF CHILDREN'S TELEVISION SERVICE IN BROADCAST LICENSE
RENEWAL
The Federal Communications Commission shall consider, among the elements in its
review of an application for renewal of a television broadcast license:
(1) whether the licensee complied with the standards required to be
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol.VI
pocket veto which effectively killed the legislation.24 Specifically, the
bill sought to limit the duration of advertising in children's
programmming and to enforce the obligation of broadcasters to meet
the educational and informational needs of the child audience.' The
bill's co-sponsor, Representative Edward Markey (Democrat,
Massachusetts), commented during the hearings that such legislation
was necessary to combat the FCC's "pursuit of its own narrow,
ideological agenda."' The FCC's decision to repeal its regulations,
he said, was a "slapdash effort that failed to meet the Commission's
statutory responsibilities as a regulatory agency."27 The bill in its
final form represented a substantial compromise with its original
scope, failing to address, as it did in its original form," such issues
as program-length commercials and the way in which such practices
blur the distinction between programming and commercial content. 9
As with any effort to regulate either access to or the content of
speech, commentators have noted that enactment of the bill will face
substantial opposition on first amendment grounds." Indeed, as the
prescribed under section 3 of this Act; and
(2) whether the licensee has served the educational and informational
needs of children in its overall programming.
24. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1988 at Al, col. 1.
25. H.R. 3966, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REr_ H3979, 3980
(1988).
26. COUNCIL OF BETIER BUSINESS BUREAUS, CHILDREN'S TELEVISION AND ADVERTISING
PRACTICES, 2 (Oct. 1987).
27. Id. See also infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
28. H.R. 3966, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H3979 (1988).
29. Such practices constitute a reversal of the traditional strategy of marketing toys
based upon successful program characters. Children's shows like "Strawberry Shortcake,"
'Transformers," and 'The Smurfs," to name but a few among the estimated seventy-five such
programs, are shows inspired by and designed to market successful toys. Davis, supra note
4, at 28. Commenting on the bill's failure to address program-length commercials,
Representative Markey noted, "Members of the Committee [Committee on Energy and
Commerce] and children's advocates made a conscious determination not to address program
length commercials in this legislation. There are difficult definitional determinations that must
be made, and possibly are better left to the Commission and courts to resolve." 134 CONG.
REC. H3980 (daily ed. June 7, 1988) (statement of Rep. Markey).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see In re Revision of Programming & Commercialization
Policies, 2 F.C.C. Rcd 6822 (1987). In the context of requesting information and comment
on reinstating children's television guidelines, the FCC also requested comment about how
any proposed restrictions would comport with existing commercial free speech doctrine: "We
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court noted in Action for Children's Television,3 the FCC "has been
sensitive to the limits imposed by the First Amendment on its
regulatory efforts,"3 and has "carefully emphasized that '[a]lthough
the unique nature of the broadcasting medium may justify some
differences in the First Amendment standard applied to it, it is clear
that any regulation of programming must be reconciled with free
speech considerations. '
Thus, the purpose of this article is to examine the regulation
and deregulation of children's television from the standpoint of the
commercial free speech doctrine, a doctrine that will undoubtedly
.be brandished in defense of advertisers' rights to promote lawful
products in ways that are neither false nor deceptive. The develop-
ment of the commercial free speech doctrine has forced the courts
to make distinctions between types of speech, 3' relegating the first
amendment protection of commercial speech to a lower standard of
scrutiny. 5 This process of balancing the protection of free expres-
sion with the government's interest in regulation, its taking into
account recent and ongoing efforts to deregulate industries as
diverse as the airlines, commercial advertising, and broadcasting,
presents an important distinction between the market for ideas and
the market for goods and services.'
This article will first review the development of the regulatory
note that Congress has also recognized that examination of children's advertising issues gives
rise to First Amendment concerns." Id. at 6825.
31. Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C. 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
32. Id. at 741 n.1.
33. Id. (quoting In re Petition of Action for Children's Television (ACT), 50 F.C.C.2d
1, 3 (1974) affd sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C., 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir.
1977)).
34. See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
36. Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979). The point of the authors' argument is that the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press protects only certain identifiable
values, chief among them being effective self-government and the opportunity for individual
self-expression through free speech. Neither value, the authors claim, is implicated by
governmental regulation of commercial speech. "In the realm of ideas, the first amendment
erects stringent safeguards against governmental restraint. In the economic sphere, by
contrast, the majoritarian political process controls." Id. at 2.
1988]
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and self-regulatory scheme of children's television and the gradual
movement towards deregulation, including the role of the FTC and
other advertising review bodies. In addition, a sample of cases
testing the limits of that regulation will be discussed. Finally, the
development of the commercial free speech doctrine will be
examined, and areas of controversy in its application to the
regulation of advertising with respect to children's television will be
suggested. This analysis will yield the conclusion that short of
absolutely curtailing advertisers' activities, regulation is constitutional-
ly permissible to serve a substantial government interest which is not
adequately served by the marketplace alone.
I. THE REGULATION OF CHILDREN'S TELEVISION:
THE FCC, THE FIC AND TIE NAB CODE
The dynamic field of broadcasting is undergoing significant
regulatory changes due, in part, to the proliferation of new forms of
communication such as cable and satellite received television, and,
in part, to federal efforts allowing the marketplace to determine the
content and commercialization levels of programming.37 Where the
FCC once exercised some authority over broadcasters' conduct,
either through its direct efforts or through such other regulatory
mechanisms as the FTC and the NAB Code,'s this area is now
deregulated to the extent that, as one commentator noted, "difficult
37. When, in 1984, the FCC undertook to delete existing commercialization guidelines
for television broadcasters, see infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text, its action was based
on the general proposition that in a highly competitive market, such as television broadcasting,
there were constraints external to the regulatory process that would properly control
commercial levels. At that time, the FCC stated, "it seems clear to us that if stations exceed
the tolerance level of viewers by adding 'too many' commercials the market will regulate itself,
i.e., the viewers will not watch and the advertisers will not buy time." In re Revision of
Programming & Commercialization Policies, 2 F.C.C. Rcd 6822, 6823 (1987) (quoting In re
Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1105 (1984)).
See infra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
38. In the wake of such manifestly widespread public support for ACT's proposed rules,
and, perhaps, in apprehensive anticipation of possible agency adoption of those rules, the
broadcast industry undertook limited self-regulation. In 1971 the self-regulatory Code of the
NAB was reinterpreted to prohibit the use of certain possibly deceptive advertising techniques.
Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C., 564 F.2d 457, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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questions arise concerning the obligation and proper role of
government."39
The authority of the FCC over electronic communications
derives from the Communications Act of 1934,' which gives the
FCC broad powers to regulate broadcasting as "public convenience,
interest or necessity requires."41  The licensing of broadcasters has
enabled the FCC to monitor compliance with the public interest
standard. While the FCC is prohibited by law from censoring the
content of broadcasting and from interfering with free speech,43
there are limited exceptions to the no-censorship provisions of the
Act." The FCC is generally, however, not permitted to direct
broadcasters in the selection and scheduling of programs and
announcements, including commercial messages.5
Typically, broadcasters have been regarded as public fiduciaries,
39. Silberstein, Deregulation and Children's Advertising, 2 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 603, 611
(1985).
40. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 152-609 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
41. Id. § 303.
42. Id. §§ 307(a), 309(a), 310(d).
43. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N MASS MEDIA BUREAU PUBLICATION, FCC
REGULATION OF BROADCAST ADVERTISING: BAsic LAWS AND POLICIES, No. 8310-100, §
5(a)(1985) 3-62.
44. Id. Exceptions include prohibitions on obscenity, indecency, and profanity, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), on the pre-arrangement or pre-determination of broadcast
contests, 47 U.S.C. § 508 (1982), and on subliminal advertising (deriving from the prohibitions
of coven advertising in 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
45. The FCC, however, is not prohibited from developing broad guidelines to rationally
direct licensees in their service of the public interest. Guidelines dictating no specific
programs and allowing broadcasters wide discretion in satisfying the guidelines, see, e.g., 47
C.F.R. § 0.283(a)(7)(i)(A) (1985), have been judically approved. See Great Falls Community
TV Cable v. F.C.C., 416 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1969) "[Slection 405 [of the U.S.C.] . . .leaves
room for the operation of sound judicial discretion to determine whether and to what extent
judicial review of questions not raised before the agency should be denied." Id. at 239.
However, in National Ass'n. of Independent Television Producers & Distributors v. F.C.C.,
516 F.2d 526, 538 (2d Cir. 1975), a children's programming exception to the prime time
access rule was upheld, demonstrating that the FCC can legitimately prefer certain categories
of programming over others consistent with the first amendment. Id. at 538. See In re
Children' Television Programming & Advertising Practices, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, 699-70 n.53
(1984) (dissenting Statement of Commissioner Henry M. Rivera). The prime time access rule
defines the quantity of network programming which may be shown during prime time and
deducts from the limitation "programs designed for public affairs programs" and news events,
among other programming. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1987).
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who have been granted an exclusive license to use a limited
resource, the broadcast spectrum.' The 'scarcity rationale'47 has
been criticized in recent years, owing to the development of new
technologies which allegedly serve to broaden viewers' choices and
place greater burdens on broadcasters to attract audiences. '
Although the FCC recently abandoned the fairness doctrine on
grounds that it 'chilled' speech by allowing the government to
scrutinize program content and that the number of broadcast outlets
available to the public had increased,49 scarity remains an important
component of regulatory authority.
The public interest standard, codified by the FCC in 1946,0
included noncommercial programming, local live programs, programs
devoted to public issues, and the elimination of excess advertising,
all of which were to be considered in both new and renewal
broadcast license applications."1 In 1960, however, the FCC repealed
its requirements for noncommercial programming," and added a
provision ordering licensees to ascertain and serve diverse com-
munity programming needs." Thus, the FCC sought to encourage
self-regulation by placing the burden of compliance with the public
46. See United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 156 (D.D.C.
1982) (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys., v. Democratic Nat'l. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101
(1973)). See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
47. The "scarcity rationale" derives, in part, from FCC decisions defining the Commis-
sion's authority to impose content restrictions on broadcasters such as the Fairness Doctrine,
which requires stations to present programming that addresses controversial public issues of
public importance and that such stations afford a reasonable opportunity for the presentation
of opposing views. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Since the
government allocates to broadcasters a scarce public resource, broadcast frequencies, it is
therefore empowered to require broadcasters to make such reply times available. Id. at
400-01.
48. Note, Changing Channels in Broadcast Regulation: Leaving Television Advertising to
Containment by Market Forces, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 465, 466 (1984).
49. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station WTVH, 2
F.C.C. Rcd 5043 (1987).
50. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF
BROADCAST LICENSES (1946).
51. Id. at 55.
52. En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960) (Report and Statement of
Policy Res: Commission en banc Programming Inquiry).
53. Id. at 2314-16.
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trustee standard on the licensee. 4
The history of the FCC's involvement with the FTC and the
NAB provides a revealing view of how the FCC's regulatory posture
has changed, particularly with regard to children's television. From
its inception in 1952, the FCC has looked to the NAB Code for
guidance in giving substance to the public interest standard.5 Since
broadcasters' compliance with the Code ensured fulfillment of the
FCC's public interest requirement, the NAB grew in influence by
providing definitive guidelines for program content and advertising
time. 6  This method of industry self-regulation worked, for the
most part, without controversy for many years. In 1971, however,
the FCC instituted its First Notice of Inquiry to explore and define
the fundamental issues of children's television.'" This decision was
based on reaction to widespread public support of a petition
circulated by the lobbying group, Action for Children's Television,
which called for increased scrutiny of advertising directed at
54. Note, supra note 41, at 474. The FCC noted fourteen major elements of program
material in order to best guide the licensee towards satisfying the trustee standard, including
children's programs. See also Broadcast Advertisements: Hearings on H.R. 8316 Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 162
(1963).
55. Note, supra note 41, at 477. The NAB Code is essentially a self-regulatory version
of the Blue Book, which urges broadcasters to scrutinize the quality of advertising aired by
their stations. The Code was adopted in 1952 by the NAB and consisted of guidelines to
help broadcasters meet their statutory obligations to operate in the public interest.
Subscription to the Code was voluntary, and subscribers were entitled to display a Seal of
Good Practice indicating Code subscription. Id.
56. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 609, (citing Brosterhaus, United States v. National
Association of Broadcasting. The De-Regulation of Self-Regulation, 35 FED. COMM. LJ. 313,
314 (1983)).
57. In re Petition of Action for Children's Television, 28 F.C.C.2d 368 (1971) (Notice
of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). Here the FCC noted:
It is apparent that there are high public interest considerations involved in the use
of television ... in relation to a large and important segment of the audience, the
nation's children. The importance of this portion of the audience, and the character
of material reaching it, are particularly great because its ideas and concepts are
largely not yet crystallized and are therefore open to suggestion, and also because
its members do not yet have the experience and judgment always to distinguish the
real from the fanciful.
Id. at 369-70.
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children. 8 In 1972, the NAB amended its code to reduce the
allowable time for non-program material during children's program-
ming from sixteen to twelve minutes per hour59 and restrict the
content of breakfast cereal and snack food advertising.'
In 1974, encouraged by NAB's efforts, the FCC issued its
comprehensive Children's Television Report and Policy Statement.61
The Policy Statement endorsed NAB's guidelines,' including those
"prime time" standards and methods of separating program content
from advertising.' While the FCC explicitly refrained from
establishing an independent policy, it did state that it expected
broadcasters to limit the amount of advertising in children's
programming,' separate commercials from program content, and
eliminate host-selling and tie-in practices (the practice of displaying
a sponsor's products on the set of a program).' The FCC em-
phasized the need for regulation since preschoolers were generally
incapable of distinguishing program content from advertising and
were unaware of the persuasive aims of advertisers." Later in 1974,
the FCC decided not to ban all advertising from children's pro-
grams.6' This decision was made in response to a petition advanced
by Productive Action for Children's Television asking the FCC to
reconsider its Policy Statement. The FCC reasoned that efforts to
clearly separate advertising and program content would be sufficient
58. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 609 n.56.
59. Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C., 564 F.2d 458, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
60. Id. The NAB began to require that advertisements for breakfast cereals emphasize
the importance of a balanced diet, that no advertisement encourage children to ingest
immoderate amounts of candy and snack foods, and that children not be directly encouraged
to pressure their parents into buying advertised products.
61. In re Petition for Action For Children's Television (ACT), 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974),
affid sub nor. Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C., 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
62. In re Petition for Action for Children's Television (ACT), 50 F.C.C. 2d 1, 11-14
(1974).
63. Id. "Prime time" is considered to be 7:00pm - 11:00pm. Id.
64. Id. at 14.
65. Id. at 13, 15-18.
66. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF TELEVISION
ADVERTISING ON CHILDREN 25 (1977).
67. In re Petition of Action for Children's Television, 55 F.CC.2d 691 (1975) (Memo-
randum Opinion and Order).
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means to safeguard children.'
In 1975, the FCC required its licensees to provide more
information on advertising practices than the NAB had required for
children's programming during the previous licensing term.69
Although the FCC was providing some leadership on issues of
children's television, groups such as Action for Children's Television
(ACT) continued to challenge the efficacy of the NAB Code and
NAB studies indicating widespread compliance among its member
stations.7" Three years later, the FCC issued its Second Notice of
Inquiry to determine if self-regulation was effective and to rees-
tablish the Children's Television Task Force.7' The Task Force
report, 2 released in October, 1979, concluded that advertising
guidelines had been met, and therefore, further FCC rulemaking
should concern itself only with policy options for children's program-
ming and not for children's advertising.' There was, however, a
storm brewing on the horizon of NAB's self-regulatory code, which
would have far-reaching implications not only for the NAB, but for
the FCC's view of its own regulatory role.
Along with the NAB, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
played an important role in the regulation of children's television.
In 1957 the FCC formalized a relationship with the FTC regarding
regulation of deceptive advertising74 underscoring the FCC's
reluctance to engage in content-based review of alleged deceptive
advertising in favor of referring all such claims to the FTC for
68. Id.
69. In re Petition of Action for Children's Television, 53 F.C.C.2d 161 (1975) (Memo-
randum Opinion and Order).
70. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 611.
71. In re Children's Programming & Advertising Practices, 68 F.C.C.2d 1344, 1344 (1978).
72. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, TELEVISION PROGRAMMING FOR CHILDREN:
A REPORT OF THE CHILDREN'S TELEVISION TASK FORCE (1979) [hereinafter FCC STAFF
REPORT].
73. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 612. The Task Force report stressed that broadcasters
had not followed programming guidelines, thus narrowing the scope of further FCC studies
concerning rulemaking options necessary to guide broadcasters' presentation of children's
programming. Id.
74. Liaison Between FCC and FTC Relating to False Misleading Radio and Television
Advertising, 22 F.C.C. 1572 (1957).
1988]
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
investigation and disposition. The FTC Staff Report issued in
1978,' 5 examined a cross-section of possible remedies, concluding that
children's advertising was possibly inherently unfair and deceptive.'
These remedies included banning all televised advertising directed at
audiences of young children too young to evaluate such advertising,
banning advertising of sugared snacks aimed at audiences of young
children, and requiring that advertisers fund nutritional and health
disclosures to balance the advertising of certain sugared foods.' In
April of 1978, the FTC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
calling for comments on children's advertising, in response to
petitions from three different public interest groups, Action for
Children's Television, Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc.,
and Committee on Children's Television. 78
It was, however, to be a hollow exercise. Merely two years
later, Congress passed the FTC Improvements Act," which effective-
ly forestalled further FTC proceedings on the subject. Section 11
of the Act reinterpreted the FTC's mission with respect to its
regulation of advertising.' No longer could the FTC regulate
advertising on the basis of fairness. The new "standard" in the
advertising industry was deceptiveness,"1 widely believed to be the
result of concentrated and overwhelming big business lobbying.'
75. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 605 n.19 (citing F.T.C. Final Staff Report and
Recommendation in the Matter of Children's Advertising (TRR No. 215-60) (Mar. 31, 1981)
citing F.T.C. Staff Report on Television Advertising to Children (1978)).
76. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 605 n.19 (citing F.T.C. Final Staff Report and
Recommendation in the Matter of Children's Advertising (TRR No. 215-60) (Mar. 31, 1981)
at 11).
77. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 605 n.19 (citing F.T.C. Final Staff Report and
Recommendation in the Matter of Children's Advertising (TRR No. 215-60) (Mar. 31, 1981)
at 11-12).
78. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 604 n.18.
79. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat.
374 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46, 50, 57a, 57b(1)-b(4), 7c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
80. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat.
374, § 11 (codified as 15 U.S.C § 57a).
81. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 605.
82. Id. at 605 n.20.
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The 1981 FrC Final Staff Report and Recommendations on the
Matter of Children's Advertising' addressed three issues: whether
children's cognitive abilities were sufficient to allow them to evaluate
advertising; what remedies were sufficient to mitigate the effects of
such advertising; and how was the impact of sugared food advertise-
ments on children's dental health and nutritional attitudes to be
measured. Despite acknowledging that children are exposed to
certain dangers in advertising, the Final Report recommended, in
light of the recently passed FTC Improvements Act, that the FTC
terminate its inquiry into possible rules for children's advertising.'
Since the Final Report refused to consider whether advertising
directed at children was deceptive per se,' further rulemaking was
effectively rendered moot.
First, the Report conceded that children under the age of six
are not capable of learning the cognitive skills necessary to evaluate
television commercials. 7 Although young children may have the
ability to distinguish between programs and commercials, it is most
probable that they do not fully understand that the intent of the
advertising is to persuade or sell a product.' However, even though
such a conclusion seems to bear out the inherent deception
argument advanced by children's lobbying groups, the Final Report
was unwilling to commit the resources of the FTC to what it called
"impractical solutions. '" 9  Fearing that banning advertising on
83. 47 Fed. Reg. 21,019 (1981).





89. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 605-06. The Report alternatively considered a ban on
advertising limited to all audiences of which young children constituted a substantial
proportion, and to those audiences of which children constituted fifty, thirty, or twenty percent
of the audience. The Report found, however, that a twenty percent threshold level, regardless
of how many shows would be affected, would be overinclusive. FCC STAFF REPORT, supra
note 72, at 39-40. Some alternatives advanced to avoid overinclusiveness were rejected. Id.
at 45 n.131. Such alternatives included the classification of commercials by their marketing
techniques (as either child oriented or not), Id. at 42-44, or clearly designating certain
commercials as children's commercials (by their placement directly before or after children's
programming). Id. at 44 n.126.
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programs in which the audience was substantially composed of young
children would be subject to charges of overinclusiveness, the Final
Report concluded that alternatives such as classifying commercials
which primarily used child-oriented techniques or predesignating
certain shows as children's programs were not narrowly tailored
enough to meet the presumed goal of protecting young children.'
With respect to sugared foods advertisements, the Final Report
concluded that evidence was inconclusive regarding the effect of
such advertising on children's attitudes towards nutrition, and,
further, that there were numerous factors which impacted on tooth
decay.91 The Report thus recommended that the FTC cease its
inquiries into that area.' In sum, despite compelling evidence
indicating that children were often unwitting victims of the con-
siderable skills of professional advertisers, the FTC would not
consider remedies which could not assure a measurable and precise
result.
On the NAB front, the storm broke in 1979 when the Justice
Department filed suit against the NAB Code Authority for violating
the Sherman Antitrust Act. 93 The government claimed that three
Code provisions violated antitrust laws: limits on the number of
commercials per hour, limits on the number of consecutive announ-
cements interrupting programs, and the prohibition of advertising of
two or more products in a commercial of less than sixty seconds.'
As a threshold matter, the court held, according to antitrust law,
that it could only examine the Code in light of the particular
characteristics of the broadcasting industry:95 its finite number of
broadcast frequencies, its absolute restrictions imposed by limited
broadcast time, and its duty to operate in the public interest.' Since
broadcasters would limit the amount of commercial time and
90. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 606-07.
91. Id. at 607-08.
92. Id. at 608.
93. United States v. National Ass'n. of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 153-4 (D.D.C.
1982). Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1982 & Supp. 11 1986).
94. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. at 149.
95. Id. at 156.
96. Id. at 156-57.
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program interruptions even in the absence of government regulation
or industry self-regulation, the court denied the government's motion
for summary judgment on these issues.'
With respect, however, to the standard prohibiting "piggybac-
king," that is, advertising two or more products in one commercial
of less than sixty seconds, the court found that this ban further
restricted the already limited supply of commercial time, which
compelled advertisers to purchase more time than they otherwise
might." Therefore, the ban violated the antitrust laws." Despite
NAB's claim that the Code had been endorsed by various govern-
mental bodies and was therefore exempt from antitrust restrictions,1"
the court found that this had not been clearly demonstrated, and,
more importantly, only Congress had the authority to grant exemp-
tions.1  Thus the court found that the Code standards constituted
an illegal restraint of trade, granted summary judgment on the
government's motion, and enjoined enforcement of the NAB
Code."°
Although only the "piggybacking" standard was held to be
violative of the antitrust laws, a consent decree was entered into
whereby the NAB agreed to cease disseminating and enforcing its
Code in toto, in return for cessation of the prosecution of all
antitrust claims against it. 3 The court also refused ACT's recom-
mendation that the decree be modified no exclude enforcement of
the Code's provisions with respect to children's advertising, noting
that "there was no necessary conflict between competition and the
goal of protecting children from excessive commercial advertising.
...Competition ...can be expected to continue to foster such
individual restraint once the NAB's collective restraints are lifted."'"
Following the consent decree, only the FCC's promise to
97. Id. at 157.
98. Id. at 160.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 168.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 169-70.
103. United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 553 F. Supp. 621 (D.D.C. 1982).
104. Id. at 624 n.8 (emphasis in original).
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intervene, where necessary to protect children against broadcasters'
abuses, remained in the absence of FCC regulations and NAB
Code protections."° ACT again brought an action to reinstate the
NAB Code,"° maintaining that the proper application of antitrust
principles compelled consideration of the effects of an antitrust
decision on other public policies."° ACT also argued that the
considerable influence of television upon children should be closely
scrutinized, particularly when viewed in the context of their inability
to make informed decisions based upon the content of advertising."°
The Justice Department responded that the settlement did not
prevent broadcasters from unilaterally decreasing advertising,"° and
furthermore that public policy choices were properly for Congress,
and not for the judiciary branch, to decide.1 °
With the dissolution of the NAB Code, the FCC reopened
rulemaking procedures on children's television in March, 1983."'
Those supporting stricter regulation advocated reinstatement of the
1974 Policy Statement Advertising Guidelines based on four specific
grounds: broadcast industry recidivism, abolition of the NAB Code,
FCC's adoption of the short form renewal (a postcard format
consisting of five questions, none of which dealt with children's
television)," and the general need for more specific advertising
standards.' In response, the reconvened Task Force found that
licensees were in compliance with the 1974 Policy Statement
Advertising Standards (a conclusion sharply at odds with ACT's
interpretation of the relevant statistics). The FCC then terminated
the proceedings.'14
105. Silberstein, supra note 32, at 614.
106. 47 Fed. Reg. 49,108-09 (1982).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 49,110.
109. Id. at 49,113.
110. Id.
111. 48 Fed. Reg. 18,860 (1983).
112. 46 Fed. Reg. 26,236 (1981).
113. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,704-06 (1984).
114. Id. at 1,714.
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111. THE DEREGULATION OF CHILDREN'S TELEVISION:
THE 1984 REPORT
In 1983, the FCC began the process of deregulating the
programming and commercial content of broadcast television with
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.U In its proposal, the FCC noted
that television should follow the path of deregulation in order to
successfully compete with the emerging popularity of cable and
satellite transmissions, and that the growth of the industry, in terms
of the numbers of television sets in use and stations broadcasting,
showed a competitive market less worthy of governmental regula-
tion. 16
Following receipt of comments, the Commission's report"7
eliminated all quantitative commercial guidelines for television
broadcasting, finding that "commercial levels will be effectively
regulated by marketplace forces... [and that] if stations exceed the
tolerance level of viewers ... the market will regulate itself ....
Despite ACT's evidence that market forces do not play a role in
regulating the commercial content of children's television,"' the
115. In re Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, 94 F.C.C.2d 678
(1983) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
116. Id. at 680, 688-94.
117. Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Require-
ments & Program Log Requirements For Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076
(1984) (Report and Order).
118. Id. at 1105.
119. See In re Children's Television Programming & Advertising Practices, 96 F.C.C.2d
634 (1984) (Report and Order). With the abolition of the NAB Code and in the absence
of what some commenters considered vague FCC guidelines, the FCC noted:
ACT argues that the responsibility for children's television programming rests
squarely on the shoulders of each broadcast licensee. Therefore, relying on other
sources of children's programming is contrary to the law and antithetical to the
interests of children. Under the theory of "market" responsibility, maintains ACT,
the fact that some stations serve children would act as a disincentive to any
expansion of children's programming. Furthermore, this approach would destroy
licensee accountability to the public and to the Commission. ACT further argues
that shifting responsibility for children's programming to public broadcasting would
have an adverse effect on the diversity of children's programming. Nor, in ACT's
view, should this responsibility be shifted to the new technologies .... Consumers
would incur substantial costs (installation and monthly charges) .... Because these
new technologies are not subject to the public interest standard of the Communica-
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report failed to address ACT's concerns, and indeed never men-
tioned the children's television commercialization policy. Not until
a request for clarification of the scope of the report was made by
the NAB"2 did the FCC indicate that the deregulation of television
commercialization applied to children's television as well."'
Comment on this subject was limited to the observation that
deregulation of children's television was "consistent with the general
de-emphasis of qualitative guidelines," and that advertising provided
the bulk of support for children's programming.' It was this
language, or the dearth of it, that one circuit court later found
insufficient to support the FCC's abandonment of its children's
television guidelines, especially in light of the FCC's 15-year
recognition that children comprised a special audience."z
IV. Tim CoMwMRCiAL FREE SPEECH DoCTRnm
The commercial free speech doctrine is a relatively recent
development, and has presented courts with the difficult task of
balancing the guarantees of the first amendment with the govern-
ment's interest in regulating the content of certain messages and/or
the context in which they are delivered.24 Generally, commercial
speech is defined as "business advertising that does no more than
solicit a commercial transaction or state information relevant
thereto.""z  Commercial speech does not encompass editorial
tions Act, there is no guarantee that they will serve children. ACT argues that the
question is not what kinds of children's programming are being offered, or how
good such programs are, but rather how much time is allocated to children's
programming, and when such programs are scheduled.
1d. at 642.
120. Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C., 821 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
121. Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986)
(Memorandum Opinion and Order).
122. Id. at 370-71.
123. Action for Children's Television, 821 F.2d 741. "Far be it from us to demand
long-winded tiresome explanations. But the Commission's barebones incantation of two
abbreviated rationales cannot do service as the requisite 'reasoned basis' for altering its
long-established policy." Id. at 746.
124. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 30, at 2-4.
125. Id. at 1.
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advertising, nor does it cover discussions of goods and services in
a news context or in a consumer guide.1" As an exception to the
protections of the first amendment, commercial speech is distin-
guished from political speech or speech designed to express ideas,
and has therefore been subject to numerous restrictions that
otherwise would not be upheld on first amendment grounds. 27
Application of this doctrine has resulted in banning advertise-
ments which are offensive, although not obscene" and misleading,
although not literally false." 9 Specific information may be required
to accompany certain advertisements"' ° to remedy alleged misconcep-
tions created by previous advertising efforts,"' and warnings may be
required to accompany the advertising of specific products.'
Certainly the government may ban advertising of illegal products133
and even the advertising of legal products in certain media.'34
Extending the protections of the first amendment to commer-
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1-2.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id. at 3 n.6 (citing Federal Trade Commission Act, §§ 5, 2, 15; 15 U.S.C. §§ 45,
52, 55 (1976) (as amended); F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384-92 (1965)
(holding that a demonstration of shaving cream's ability to soften sandpaper so it could be
shaved found deceptive where a plexiglass "mock-up" was used for visual clarity).
130. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 30, at 3 n.8 (citing J.B. Williams Co. v. F.T.C., 381
F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967)) (where "Makers of 'Geritol', an iron whpplement, who represented,
directly or indirectly, that people with a tired feeling would find relief must also state that this
is true only for people suffering from an iron deficiency anemia and that the vast majority
of people experiencing tiredness do not have such a deficiency." Id.)
131. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 30, at 3 n.7 (citing Warner-Lambert Co. v. F.T.C.,
562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978)). To remedy misimpressions
caused by Listerine advertisements claiming preventive and curative properties for sore
throats, the FTC issued, in addition to a cease and desist order, an order that Warner-Lamb-
ert include in future Listerine ads the corrective statement: "Contrary to prior advertising,
Listerine will not help prevent colds or sore throats or lessen their severity." Warner-Lambert
Co., 562 F.2d at 753.
132. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982 & Supp. 111984)
(statutes requiring warning notices on packages of cigarettes and banning the broadcast
advertising of same).
133. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 30, at 4.
134. Id. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commisssion Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982) (" . . . it
shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes and little cigars on any medium of electronic
communication .... " Id).
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cial speech appears to stem from two core values in the American
system: first, an abhorrence of information rationing (curtailing
access to information and ideas which favor one viewpoint at the
expense of anothera.), and second, ensuring that free enterprise is
bolstered by "informed and reliable decision making," the byproduct
of a free flow of commercial information." The extent to which
these values override the government's intent to safeguard other
values has carved out an area of first amendment protection of
commercial speech.
In 1976, the Supreme Court first brought commercial speech
within the protections of the first amendment in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.'37 A Virginia
statute forbidding advertising by the regulated pharmacy profession
was challenged not by the pharmacists, but rather by Virginia
consumers asserting a first amendment right to receive the competi-
tive benefits of price advertising of prescription drugs by Virginia's
pharmacists. 38 The Court found the consumers had standing to sue
recognizing that "[i]f there is a right to advertise, there is a
reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by
these appellees.' 39
The Court rejected what it called Virginia's "highly paternalistic
approach"'" in banning advertising, and found that a better alterna-
tive was to:
135. COVINGTON & BURLING, A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS BAN OR
RESTRICT TOBACCO PRODUCT ADVERTISING 9 (1986).
136. Id. at 10 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)).
137. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 748 (1976).
138. Id. at 753.
139. Id. at 757.
140. Id. at 770.
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assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that
people will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed, and that the best means to that end
is to open the channels of communication rather than to
close them .... It is precisely this kind of choice, between
the danger of suppressing information, and the dangers of
misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment
makes for us. 4'
The Court, however, was careful to avoid an absolute first
amendment protection. Prior restraints and regulations of time,
place, and manner of advertising, false and misleading advertising,
advertising of illegal acts, and advertising in the broadcast media are
permissible where like regulation of noncommercial speech is not.'42
Such restraints could survive, the Court said, if they can be justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, if they
serve an important government interest, and finally, if they leave
open an alternative method of expression.'43
Significantly, the Court noted that constitutional guarantees for
commercial speech did not carry with them the need for the same
measure of protection applicable to other forms of speech." "There
are commonsense differences between speech that does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction,' and other varieties."'45 An
advertiser's greater ability to ascertain tuthfulness of his own
statements, as opposed to the news reporter's or the political
commentator's, insures commercial speech a different degree of
protection." Furthermore, the Court noted that commercial speech
is more durable: "[S]ince advertising is the sine qua non of commer-
cial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper
regulation and foregone entirely."'47 These dual attributes of greater
141. Id.
142. Id. at 770-71.
143. Id. at 771-72.
144. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
145. Id. at 771 n.24 (citation omitted).
146. Id. at 772 n.24.
147. Id.
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objectivity and hardiness, the Court concluded, "may make it less
necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the
speaker."'"
However, an important issue remained unresolved, even after
the decision in Virginia Pharmacy Board: under what cumstances
could unsupressible speech be regulated? In other words, although
commercial speech promoting goods and services enjoys some first
amendment protection, precisely how far could those constitutional
rights extend? In the 1976 decision Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Willingboro'49 the Court struck down an anti-blockbusting ordinance
enacted by a New Jersey town prohibiting the placement of "for
sale" signs on homeowners' lawns to fight "white flight" and preserve
an integrated community."'0 Appellees, relying on language in
Virginia Pharmacy Board," '1 claimed that the ordinance was merely
a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction. However, the Court
disagreed, although it acknowledged that the restriction served a
laudable purpose."2 The constitutional defect, the Court found, was
that the town did not have the right to withhold truthful and
nondeceptive information from its citizenry, reiterating the first
amendment choice (as stated in Virginia Pharmacy Board) between
the dangers of suppressing information and the misuse to which that
information might be put first. 53
It was not until 1980 that the definitive test of the constitu-
tionality of commercial speech would be drawn. In Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Cop. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York 54 the
Court reviewed a total ban on promotional advertising by electric
utilities, imposed, it was argued, to further the state's interest in
energy conservation.' In order to balance the utility's First
148. Id. (citation omitted).
149. Linmark Associates Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
150. Id. at 94.
151. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
152. Linmnark, 431 U.S. at 96-97.
153. Id. at 97.
154. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
155. Id. at 561-66.
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Amendment rights with the state's legitimate interest, the Court
developed a four-part test:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech
to come within that provision, it must at least concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we ,must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.156
Although the Court found that the advertising at issue did
concern a lawful activity and that the state's interest was indeed
substantial, it struck down the ban because it was not the least
restrictive alternative."5 7 Writing for the Court, Justice Powell found
that the state's energy conservation rationale did not outweigh the
supression of speech, because "a more limited restriction on the
content of promotional advertising would not serve adequately the
state's interests ..... " In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist admonish-
ed that the effect of this approach would be to invite chaos, that it
"leaves room for so many hypothetical 'better' ways that any
ingenious lawyer will surely seize on one of them to secure the
invalidation of what the state agency actually did."159
Cases following Central Hudson have appeared to affirm the
thrust of its balancing doctrine, and have continued to carve out a
measure of first amendment protection for commercial speech, albeit
within limitations related to the character of the advertising and the
substantiality and specific application of the state's interest in
156. Id. at 566.
157. Id. at 572.
158. Id. at 570.
159. Id. at 599-600. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, also noted, "there is no reason for
believing that the martketplace of ideas is free from marketplace imperfections any more than
there is to believe that the invisible hand will always lead to optimum economic decisions
in the marketplace." Id.
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regulation. In Metromedia v. City of San Diego," the Court
confronted a local ordinance prohibiting all outdoor advertising
signs, except for on-premises signs (signs identifying the owner/occu-
pant or advertising goods or services rendered on such premises)
and specific categories of off-premises signs (at bus stops, historical
plaques, signs displaying time, temperature, or news). 6 The stated
purpose of the law was "to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and
motorists brought about by distracting sign displays," and "to
preserve and improve the appearance of the City."'62 Justice White,
writing for the plurality, concentrated his analysis on the third prong
of the Central Hudson test, whether the ordinance directly advanced
a substantial government interest. He concluded that although
there was only sketchy evidence relating to the connection between
traffic safety and the billboards, "a legislative judgment that bill-
boards are traffic hazards is not manifestly unreasonable and should
not be set aside."'6" Similarly, absent any hint of ulterior motive, the
city could have properly determined that banning outdoor adverti-
sing advances the cause of urban esthetics." 4 The Court, however,
struck down the ordinance, not because it suppressed commercial
speech, but rather because, by permitting on-site signs, it favored
commercial speech over non-commercial speech: "Insofar as the
city tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose to limit their content
to commercial messages."'6 In sum, the Court affirmed the Central
Hudson test and seemed to indicate that San Diego could validly
prohibit all commercial billboards within its municipality, noting that
the city's esthetic and safety interests outweighed the asserted
commercial interest.
160. Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
161. Id. at 493-95 (quoting SAN DIEGO, CAL. ORDINANCE 10,795, § 101.0700 (F) (New
Series) (1972)).
162. Id. at 493.
163. Id. at 509.
164. Id. at 510.
165. Id. at 513. "Although the city may distinguish between the relative value of different
categories of commercial speech, the city does not have the same range of choice in the area
of non-commercial speech to evaluate the strength of, or distinguish between, various
communicative interests." Id. at 514.
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Of great significance for the commercial speech doctrine is the
Supreme Court's 1986 five to four decision in Posadas de Puerto
Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,'" which upheld regula-
tions partially prohibiting legalized casino gambling advertising.167 In
upholding the partial ban, the Court rejected the first amendment
claim of the appellant, a partnership franchised to operate a casino
in Puerto Rico.'" Puerto Rico's Gaming Regulations enacted
pursuant to the Games of Chance Act'" essentially allowed adverti-
sing outside Puerto Rico while prohibiting such advertising to the
public of Puerto Rico."0
The majority opinion was written by Justice Rehnquist, a
consistent dissenter in commercial speech cases upholding the first
amendment rights of advertisers.' Conceding that the regulated
advertising concerned a lawful activity and was neither fraudulent
nor deceptive, thus passing the first prong of the Central Hudson
test, Rehnquist pointed to the Puerto Rican legislature's interest in
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens as constituting a
substantial government interest, noting that these same concerns
prompted most states to ban casino gambling entirely.'" Rehnquist
concluded that the regulation advanced this same interest: "The
166. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 340-47.
169. Games of Chance Act, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 15 § 71 (1972).
170. 15 P.R. R. & Regs. tit. 15, § 76a-1(7) (1972), as amended in 1971, provides in
pertinent part: No concessionaire, nor his agent or employee is authorized to advertise the
gambling parlors to the public in Puerto Rico. The advertising of our games of chance is
hereby authorized through newspapers,magazines, radio, television and other publicity media
outside Puerto Rico subject to the prior editing and approval by the Tourism Development
Company of the advertisement to be submitted in draft to the Company. Id.
171. See, e.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, (the first amendment was designed to protect discussion of "political, social
and other public issues, rather than the decision of a particular individual as to whether to
purchase one or another kind of shampoo." Id. at 787.). (Rehnquist, . dissenting); Central
Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (the four-part test enumerated by the majority gave commercial speech falling within
the first amendment protection that was "virtually indistinguishable" from that given to
non-commercial speech. Id. at 583.).
172. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
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Puerto Rico legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the
advertising restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino
gambling aimed at residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase
the demand for the product advertised.""7 In addition, he rejected
the argument that the challenged advertising restrictions were
underinclusive since other types of gambling, namely the Puerto
Rico lottery, were not affected, noting "that for Puerto Ricans the
risk associated with casino gambling were significantly greater than
those associated with the more traditional kinds of gambling in
Puerto Rico."'74
Finally, the Court concluded that the last prong of the test,
whether the regulation was no more extensive than necessary to
advance the asserted state interest was also satisfied: "The narrow-
ing constructions of the advertising restrictions announced by the
Superior Court ensure that the restrictions will not affect advertising
of casino gambling aimed at tourists, but will apply only to such
advertising when aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico."'75
Justices Brennan's dissent criticized the majority's less than
rigorous scrutiny of the Puerto Rico legislature's decision to legalize
casino gambling in the first place. "In light of the legislature's
determination that serious harm will not result if residents are
permitted and encouraged to gamble," he wrote, "I do not see how
Puerto Rico's interest in discouraging its residents from engaging in
casino gambling can be characterized as 'substantial.""'7  Most
importantly, Justice Brennan criticized the majority for leaving it to
the legislature to determine whether the government's interest
might be protected by less extensive measures: "Rather, it is
173. Id. at 341-42.
174. Id. at 343.
175. Id. "The legislature could conclude . . . that residents of Puerto Rico are already
aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be induced by widespread
advertising to engage in such potentially harmful conduct." Id. at 344. Responding to
appellant's claim that the ban was not narrowly drawn, Justice Rehnquist later added that "it
is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the
underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less instrusive step
of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising." Id. at
346.
176. Id. at 354. (Brennan J., dissenting).
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incumbent upon the government to prove that more limited means
are not sufficient to protect its interests, and for a court to decide
whether or not the government has sustained this burden.""
While the Court, again, affirmed the four-part Central Hudson
test, and did so in the context of upholding a ban on the advertising
of a lawful product via truthful, nondeceptive means, its guidance to
advertisers and regulatory bodies is not clear, and indeed the
decision may be seen as being limited to its facts. Reaction among
advertisers and the tobacco and alcohol industries has been, predict-
ably, hostile. Wally Snyder, senior Vice President/Government
Relations of the American Advertising Federation, remarked that
"the Posadas case does not change the law with regard to what
Congress has to do to ban truthful advertising," he added that
Posadas "should be applied to a very narrow factual situation."'78
Other commentators have attempted to distinguish the Posadas
holding since gambling has traditionally been an area of significant
state interest and has only existed at the sufferance of the state."9
At the root of the controversy, however, is the belief that the
banning of truthful speech about lawful products or services is
inconsistent with a national commitment to individual choice:
The question is, do we want to be a society where you try to
manipulate people's behavior to get them to act in their own
best interests by censoring the kind of information they get?
[I]s advertising somehow less important to the society
than other kinds of information? I mean, after all, we do
live in a free market society. We do live in a society in
which the operation of the market is one of the most
important things to us. And if you cut off and control the
flow of information about lawful products, how can you
possibly hope to run an efficient free market? ... The most
177. Id. at 357.
178. COUNCIL OF BETrER BUSINESS BuREAus, Ban on Casino Ads Does Not Violate First
Amendent: U.S. High Court Ruling 4 ADVERTSING COMPLIANCE SERVICE, Issue 15, at 7-8
(1986).
179. Id. at 8.
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dangerous thing a free society can do is to permit the illusion
of freedom, but to, but to give the government the power to
control people's behavior by controlling the amount of
information available to them."s
The issue has also been framed as one which asks the underly-
ing question whether the government may seek to manipulate
people's behavior to get them to act in their own best interest by
censoring the kind of information they get.' Assuming that an
advertising regulation seeks to influence consumption of a product
or service by restricting one's exposure to information regarding
that product or service, such as a cigarette advertising ban, should
a policy change be sought through the curtailment of speech? On
the other hand, does not common sense and constitutional prece-
dent indicate that no speech is entirely beyond regulation, particular-
ly where it is questionable whether the recipients of that speech are
fully capable of mediating its message? As with any balancing
between the state's interest in regulation and the protections of the
first amendment, the quality of speech and the degree to which that
speech has come to be relied upon are not immune from analysis.
V. ComERciAL FREE SPEECH AND THE REGULATION
OF CHILDREN'S TELEVISION
In 1987 the FCC requested commenters "to examine any
potential government interests in light of applicable constitutional
principles."'" Recognizing that any "First Amendment analysis as
applied to the regulation of children's television is necessarily
different than in 1974"s when the 1974 Policy Statement declared
that commercial speech has little first amendment protection, the
FCC asked whether the concerns identified by commenters rise to
180. Free Speech and Advertising -- Who Draws the Line? (quoting of Burt Neuborne
in videotape of a forum sponsored by the Institute for Democratic Communication, Boston
University College of Communication, Apr. 2, 1987) (statement of Burt Neuborne).
181. Id.
182. See In re Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, 2 F.C.C. Rcd
6822, 6825 (1987).
183. Id. at 6825.
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the level of a "substantial" government interest.1" And, if so,
commenters were asked to discuss "whether and which methods of
restricting commercial speech directed to children both advance any
substantial interest that may be identified and are no more exten-
sive than necessary to serve such interests."'"
The concerns about commercialization guidelines that the FCC
asked commenters to address included such issues as whether young
children were too young to understand the purpose and function
of commercials (and were therefore insensitive to commercialization
levels) and whether parents and older siblings played an advisory
role such that an incentive for advertisers to limit their activities
was created.1" Additionally, comments were sought relating to the
role of alternative sources of video as possibly serving as a limiting
influence on commercialization levels as well as whether marketplace
forces generally served to regulate advertising activity. 87 Finally,
the FCC asked for conclusions regarding the effect of the number
of commercial minutes on the welfare of each of several children's
age groups, and for specific observations regarding any negative
effects to be expected from increased exposure to advertising as a
result of the withdrawal of the children's advertising guidelines."
At the outset, it is clear that any constitutional analysis must
begin with the fact that courts have consistently recognized the
special nature of children where speech issues are concerned and
particularly with respect to broadcast speech."' In F.C.C. v. Pacifica
Foundation,"9° the Supreme Court upheld an FCC order that
comedian George Carlin's monologue "Filthy Words" was indecent,
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 6823.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 6824.
189. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a conviction for
selling "girlie" magazines to a 16-year old boy, thus rendering permissable a state's
determination that material that would not be obscene when read by an adult is nonetheless
obscene when read by a minor); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943) (upholding a
statute making it a crime for a girl under the age of 18 to sell newspapers, periodicals, and
merchandise in public places); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
190. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 726.
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and recognized that the FCC action was premised on the presence
of children in the listening audience."' In April 1987, the FCC
resurrected and broadened its regulation of indecent speech, and
said that it no longer would use 10 p.m. as the point after which
broadcasters could assume children were not in the audience.
Furthermore, indecent broadcasts are actionable if broadcast when
there is a reasonable risk that children are in the audience."9
Indeed, recently a federal appeals court noted that, "the FCC has
repeatedly indicated that unique difficulties obtain in children's
television regulation and has acted on those perceived difficulties in
proceedings clearly distinct from general television policy proceed-
ings. As the agency has seen it, kids are different ... .",193 It would
seem that given both the FCC's long experience with grappling with
children's television, and the Supreme Court's recognition that
indecent speech on broadcast media may be regulated for the sake
of children, there exists a substantial government interest in scruti-
nizing content directed at children.
The more difficult questions center around whether any
regulation of children's television will directly advance that govern-
ment interest. Testimony presented to the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance by Preston Padden, president of
the Association of Independent Television Stations, noted that
"limits on the commercial content of programming designed for kids
establishes a 'strong market disincentive' against such programs
relative to other programs that are likely to attract the same
children's audience."1 In other words, if a station was only per-
mitted, for example, nine and one half minutes of advertising in a
children's show but had no limit with respect to a sitcom, and both
shows attracted children's audiences of similar size, there might be
less children's programming.1" In addition, Padden noted that
191. Id.
192. New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 62 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) paras. 10:326,
53:24(R)(23), 62:119 (Apr. 29, 1987).
193. Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C., 821 F.2d 741, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
194. COUNCIL OF BmrIER BUSINESS BUREAUS, Children's Television & Advertising




studies indicate that children and their parents are capable of using
the marketplace to register approval or disapproval of television
practices."
In light of sharp disagreement among concerned parties about
the effects of television on children, one may wonder how courts
will react to legislation based, in part, on a Congressional determina-
tion that children are indeed negatively affected by certain commer-
cialization levels. Following Posadas, a decision which is widely
disputed as to its general applicability to commercial speech doctrine
(and which gave great deference to a legislature's determination that
speech concerning a legal product, gambling, could be regulated),
it is possible that regulation based upon extensive legislative
factfinding would not be disturbed on constitutional grounds. A
related difficulty, noted by FCC Commissioner Patricia Diaz Dennis
in a separate statement concerns how products are being advertised
to children in addition to what products are being marketed to
children.
For example, if encyclopediae, books, or computers were the
products advertised to children, I question whether the
petitions we have received would have been filed. Nor does
anyone appear to be complaining about sales of Sesame
Street products from which Children's Television Workshop,
the producers of Sesame Street, receives about $30 million
annually in royalties and other income .... Mindful of..
. First Amendment interests, can our society do anything with
regard to children's television to help insure the welfare of
its children? 97
Returning once again to Winky Dink, is there something
inherently different between that sort of interactive programming
and advertising presently being scrutinized by the Congress and the
FCC? Consider a recent Children's Advertising Review Unit
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called "Captain Power." This recent CARU investigation centered
on a television commercial, which aired during children's cartoons
on independent stations and on MTV. The commercial opened with
what appeared to be a cake mix ad interrupted by static and voices:
"I think we're getting through, Captain." "What year?" "19, uh, 87,
I think. Try it." This interruption was revealed to be a 60-second
introduction to a new toy line and associated television program.
The voice continued:
Hello. To anybody watching, this is Captain Power. Jonathan
Power. Do you read? We have a situation here. The year
is 2147. Human life is threatened by Bio-Dreads . . . . I
need your help. I have instructions, please pay attention.
Weekly program transmissions on TV begin September ...
If you have the Power Jet XT-7, the XT-7, you can fire
invisible beams at enemy targets on these transmissions.
Score or be hit. Warning: The TV show will fire back. It
will fire back. Score or be hit. Warning: The TV show will
fire back. Do you understand? The power of the future is
in your hands. My next message is September . .. ."'
CARU questioned several aspects of this commercial, including
"whether the commercial's sustained fantasy, featuring the dramatic
interruption of a regular broadcast transmission, allowed children to
distinguish sufficiently between real and make believe."1  CARU
also questioned "the clarity of product presentation exclusively within
the fantastic format," the "program character, Captain Power, urging
viewers to help him by using the XT-7," and the message's urgency,
noting that children aren't "as prepared as adults to make judicious,
independent purchase decisions."'w In response to CARU's admoni-
tion that each of these concerns were violative of CARU's volun-
tary Self-Regulatory Guidelines for Children's Advertising, "the
198. COUNCIL OF BETrER BUSINESS BUREAUS, NAD Investigations: Latest Trends, 21
ADVERTISING COMPLIANCE SERV., Issue 21, at 3 (1987).
199. Id. at 18-19.
200. Id. at 19.
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advertiser noted that the challenged commercial had completed its
scheduled run, and said future ads would give consideration to
CARU's concerns."201
It should be noted that a Petition for Rulemaking was filed by
Action for Children's Television on February 9, 1987, requesting
that such programs be prohibited as contrary to the public interest.
The FCC expressed skepticism as to whether such type of program-
ming could stand on its own without the toy and whether there was
anything to indicate to a child viewer that he has to have the toy to
enjoy watching the programming.' It is well beyond the scope of
this article to come to any conclusions about the value of Captain
Power or other such programs. An equal difficulty accrues to an
analysis of parental supervision of children's viewing. Certainly, this
sort of supervision can not be governmentally mandated, notwith-
standing whatever preference one might give it over federal regula-
tion. During the debate on the Children's Television Act of 1988,
it was noted, however, that lacking FCC leadership and in-
dustry-wide self-regulation such as the NAB Code to ensure
responsible broadcasting practices, Congress was reacting to parental
failure in monitoring what their children watch or asking themselves
questions as to what they want their children to watch, and to
convey those concerns to the industry by either turning the dial to
a different program or turning off the set entirely.z'
Advocates of a hands-off policy to federal regulation of
children's television may well be ignoring important societal changes
which may impact on the ability of parents to monitor their chil-
dren's viewing habits, such as the proliferation of two-parent
wage-earner families and single-parent families. It is also significant
that commercial broadcast television occupies a decreasing share of
the viewing market, which suggests that such media as cable and
videotape are offering viable alternatives. Additionally, in light of
the difficulties in quantifying the effects of television on children,
201. Id.
202. In re Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, 2 F.C.C. Rcd 6822
(1987).
203. H.R. 3966, 100th Cong.,2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 3983 (1988).
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that is, how behavior may be affected by watching particular
programming and advertising, and at what viewing levels, regulation
generally presents extraordinary problems beyond first amendment
concerns. The present legislative initiative represents an effort to
ensure that individual broadcasters discharge their public interest
responsibility to the child audience, and further, to ensure that the
FCC takes these efforts, or lack thereof, into account at renewal of
license.
While it is understood that imposing limits on speech must
withstand the most rigorous scrutiny, it is the economic motives of
advertisers that will, on constitutional grounds, be balanced against
their perceived effect on children. Leaving this job to the market-
place alone raises serious questions about whether in the interest
of free speech, childhood itself is endangered by endowing children
with an officially unaided responsibility to make adult viewing and
purchasing decisions.
Jeffrey S. Weintraub
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